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ABSTRACT
Tirole (1985) extends Diamond's well-known model of an overlapping generations
economy with production by permitting consumption loajis (bubble asset investment) and
shows that the First Welfare Theorem still fails to hold. This paper suggests that the First
Welfare Theorem fails for the Diamond-Tirole model because intermediation is modelled as
a purely passive coordination activity. When the Diamond-Tirole model is extended to in
clude an active earnings-driven corporate intermediary owned by consumer-shareholders, the
efficiency properties ofthe model are dramatically altered. For example, if the intermediary
maximizes the minimum per- share dividend distributed to shareholders over time, every
competitive equiUbrium is Pareto efficient. The key reason for this result is that a solution
exists for theintermediary's dividend distribution problem ifand only ifprice conditions hold
which are analogous to the Cass-Balasko-Shell transversality conditions shown by Balasko
and Shell (1980) to be necessary and sufficient for Pareto efficiency in the context of a pure
exchange overlapping generations model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent study, Tirole (1985) extends Diamond's (1965, pp. 1130-1135) well-known
overlapping generations model of a private production economy by permitting consumption
loans. That is, in addition to financing the capital investment of firms, the savings of one
generation can be used to finance the consumption of agents in other generations whose
consumption demands are in excess of their endowments. Tirole then shows that the re
sulting production-consumption loan economy fails to satisfy the First Welfare Theorem.
Specifically, as reviewed in Section 2, below, two stationary competitive equilibria exist for
this economy: a Pareto inefficient equilibrium e with no consumption loans; and a Pareto
efficient "golden-rule" equihbrium e" in which consumption loans are made.
This paper suggests that the failure of the Diamond-Tirole economy to satisfy the First
Welfare Theorem can be attributed to the passive role assigned to intermediation.^ The only
intermediary in the Diamond-Tirole economy is an impHcitly present Walrasian Auctioneer
concerned with coordination but not with optimization. As detailed in Section 3, below,
private agents in the Diamond-Tirole economy do not exploit earnings opportunities which
arise from suboptimal intertemporal trade and credit arrangements.
To explore this issue further, the Diamond-Tirole economy is generalized in Section 4 to
include the explicit presence of a corporate intermediary owned by consumer-shareholders.^
The efficiency properties exhibited by the resulting "Brokered Economy" then depend on
the exact modelling of the intermediary's objective. One possibility is that the Brokered
Economy intermediary behaves as a Walrasian Auctioneer, i.e., a price-setting agent con-
similar claim ismade by Pingle andTesfatsion (1991) for Samuelson's (1958) pure exchange economy,
a special case of the Diamond-Tirole economy.
^Bernanke and Gertler (1985,1986) also introduce intermediaries ("banks" or "insider investment coali
tions") into an overlapping generations model. However, they focus on the potential role of these inter
mediaries in reducing deadweight losses due to principal-agent problems in the loan market for investment
projects. They do not permit intermediaries to issue consumption loans. The closest forerunner to the
present paper is apparently E. Thompson (1967). Thompson argues that genuinely perfect competition
requires the introduction of amarket for private debt instruments (e.g., a.corporate pension fund), amarket
omitted from models such as Samuelson (1958).
cerned only with trade and credit coordination. In Part A of Section 5 it is shown that tlie
Brokered Economy reduces to the Diamond-Tirole Economy in this case, and hence supports
the Pareto inefficient competitive equilibrium e. Another possibility, however, is that the in
termediary is an active optimizing agent with an earnings objective. In this case, it is shown
that the Pareto ineflicient outcome e cannot be supported as a competitive equilibrium for
the Brokered Economy under any reasonable specification for the intermediary s earnings
objective; for, given e, the intermediary would correctly perceive the possibility of increasing
his net earnings in every period.
A number of subtle issues arise, however, when an attempt is made to specify a rea
sonable earnings objective for the corporate intermediary, given that the usual competitive
assumption of price-taking is to be retained for the intermediary as well as for producers and
consumers. These issues are taken up in Part B of Section 5. It is shown, for example, that
the very meaning of "profits" is ambiguous. Nevertheless, if the intermediary maximizes the
minimum per capita dividend distributed to shareholders over time, the Pareto efficient al
location associated with the golden-rule competitive equilibrium e" for the Diamond-Tirole
economy is the unique stationary equilibrium allocation for the Brokered Economy
More generally, given this dividend objective for the corporate intermediary, it is shown
that the market value of the intermediary is maximized at each point in time, and every
Brokered Economy equihbrium is Pareto efficient. The crucial fact used to estabhsh this
Brokered Economy first welfare theorem is that the solution set for the intermediary's op
timization problem is nonempty if and only if certain price conditions hold. These price
conditions are analogous to the well-known Cass-Balasko-Shell price conditions determined
in Balasko and Shell (1980) to be necessary and sufficient for Pareto efficiency in the context
of a pure exchange overlapping generations economy. The important point here is that an
economic interpretation is provided for these price conditions; they are the "transversality
conditions" for the optimizing corporate intermediary.
Overall, our findings suggest that the inefficiency exhibited by commonly used models
for dynamic open-ended competitive economies can, to a large extent, be accounted for by
the fact that intermediary behavior is modelled as a purely passive coordination activity. As
demonstrated here for the Diamond-Tirole economy, this inefficiency might well be signifi
cantly reduced or eliminated if intermediation were to be more realistically modelled as an
activity oriented toward the exploitation of earnings opportunities.
2. THE DIAMOND-TIROLE ECONOMY
A. The Basic Diamond-Tirole Model
The basic model of this paper is Diamond's classicframework (1965), generalized as in
Tirole (1985) to include the possibility that consumer savings are invested in a "bubble asset"
as well as in capital. Savings invested in the bubble asset are used to finance consumption
loans.
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer lives for just two
periods, "youth" and "old age." The generation of consumers born at the beginning of
period t consists of Lt consumers and is referred to as "generation i." Population grows at
the rate n > 0, so that' Lt+i = [1 -I- n]Lt. The economy begins in period 1 with Lq > 0 old
consumers of generation 0 and Li = [1 -f- n]Lo young consumers of generation 1.
There is a single resource which may either be consumed or used in production as capital.
Adopting the conventional time dating of goods, the resource during period t will be referred
to as "good i." Each young consumer in each generation ^ > 1 inelastically supphes one unit
of labor in return for a real (resource) wage Wt. Wage income is used by young consumers
to provide young-age consumption cj and savings Sf. Old-age consumption is provided
entirely from savings and accumulated interest; old consumers do not work.
Consumer saving takes two forms: investment in capital; and investment in a bubble asset
which pays no dividends.^ The bubble asset can be thought of as vouchers representing real
purchasing power—for example, real money balances or bonds. If capital and the bubble
asset are both to be held in competitive equilibrium, the bubble asset must bear the same
yield as capital. Thus, it is assumed that saving in either form has a common rate of return
rf+i over each period t > 1.
Preferences of consumers in every generation t > I are cissumed to be identical. The
objective of each generation t young consumer is to maximize his lifetime utility
where U(') has the usual curvature properties."* Given any > 0 and > —1, the
problem faced by this young consumer tak^ the form
(1) max£/(c,,c,+,)
with respect to subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
c] = Wi-St;
-
^t+1 — 1 + ;
Let the solution to this problem be denoted by
(2) x(wurt+i) = (s{wurt+i),c\wt,rt+i),c'^iwt,rt+i)) .
Each old consumer in the initial period 1 is cissumed to be entitled to a principal-plus-
interest payment [1 +ri]5o» where the savings level Sq satisfies Sq = 5(uJo,ri), and the savings
function 5(-) coincides with the savings function determined for each generation t > I agent
in (2). The consumption of each old consumer in period 1 is therefore cj = [1 + f\]s(wo,ri).
^An asset is said to exhibit a "bubble" at time i if its price at time t differs from its fundamental value,
determined as the present vajue of its current and future dividends. A "bubble asset" is any asset on which
a bubble may form. When an asset pays no dividends, it necessarily exhibits a bubble whenever its price
is positive. Tirole (1985) does not incorporate a market for stock shares into his model, hence bubbles on
capital holdings are not considered.
^Specifically, it is assumed that £/"(•) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly
quasi-concave, with C/(0, cf^i) = U(.c\,0) = U{0,0).
Output in the Diamond-Tirole Economy is produced at the beginning of each period
using capital and labor inputs in accordance with the production relation V = F{K,L).
The production function F(-) is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, and to satisfy
the usual continuity and curvature restrictions.® Letting k = K/L and y = Y/L denote the
capital-labor ratio and the output-labor ratio, respectively, the production relation can be
expressed in per-capita (i.e., per-worker) form as y = F(k^ 1) = f{k).
In each period t > I the producer must pay the rental rate n on capital employed and
the wage rate Wt to laborers employed. The price-taking producer selects levels of capital
and labor inputs to maximize profits. Formally, the producer's problem may be stated as
(3) max [F{K, L) —rtK —WtL .
^ '' A'>o,L>o'' ^ ^ J
In order for a vector [Kt^Lt) of capital and labor inputs to solve problem (3), it is both
necessary and sufficient that the capital-labor ratio kt = Kt/Lt satisfy
(4) r, = f (fcO ;
(5) = m) - nkt)k •
Conditions (4) and (5) generate the well-known "factor-price frontier" relationship be
tween the wage rate Wt and the interest rate r^. For any given interest rate > 0, let k{rt)
denote the capital-labor ratio kt which uniquely satisfies condition (4). Substituting k{rt)
into condition (5), the wage rate Wt which satisfies condition (5) is then uniquely determined
as a strictly decreasing function of Vf Hereafter this wage rate will be denoted by u^(rt).
In each period < > 1 the supply of capital consists of aggregate savings St-i = Lt-iSt-i
less that part of savings held in the form of the bubble asset. Let Bt-i = denote
aggregate bubble asset holdings and Kt denote the producer's aggregate demand for capital.
®More precisely, the following restrictions are imposed on twice continuous differentiability and
strict concavity over the positive orthant with Fk > 0, Fl > 0, and Fkk < 0; continuity over the
nonnegative orthant R\; and, for each L > 0, Fk{I<, as K -*• -l-oo and Fk(K, L) -* -foo as A" 0.
Then, in per capita terms, supply equals demand® in the capital market when
(6) 5t_i —6^-1 — \ n kt .
As in Tirole (1985, p. 1503), the following restriction is imposed on the growth of the
aggregate bubble asset holdings Bt'.
(7) —[1 + ,
or, in per-capita terms,
(8) ht = [(1 + n)/(l + •
The implications of restriction (7) are examined in Section 3, below.
Young consumers in each period t > I supply labor inelastically, in total amount Lt.
Supply equals demand in the labor market when the producer chooses to employ this labor
supply. Hereafter it is assumed without further comment that supply equals demand in the
labor market in each period so that Lt denotes the period t work force as well as the period
t population of young consumers.
Since capital in the Diamond-Tirole Economy does not depreciate, the total supply of
product available during any period t > 1 is The total demand for product includes
capital demand for the following period, Kt+i, and aggregate consumption for the current
period, Ltc] + In per capita terms, supply equals demand in the product market for
period t when
(9) kt = [In]kt+i + cj + c?/[l + n] .
®In the standard Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model, market clearing conditions typically only
require that supply be at least as great as demand in quantity terms. Walras' law then implies that any
good in excess supply must have a zero price. However, Walras- law typically does not hold for overlapping
generations models (see, e.g., Wilson (1981)), and market clearing conditions have traditionally been stated
in a stronger form requiring directly that supply equal demand in each market in real value terms. See, for
example, Diamond (1965), Gale (1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Scheinkman (1983) , Tirole (1985), Weil
(1987), and Aliprsintis et al. (1990).
Finally, following Tirole (1985, p. 1505), the economy is initialized by ctssuming that the
capital-labor ratio > 0 and the per capita bubble asset holdings 6o ^ 0 are historically
given. The capital-labor ratio ko in turn determines the initial interest rate tq and the initial
wage rate wq in accordance with the marginal productivity conditions
(10) To = fiko) ;
(11) Wo = f{ko) - f'{ko)ko .
The Diamond-Tirole Economy can then be reduced to a pair of difference equations in the
"state variables" kt and bt over times i > 1,
(12) [1 + n]h = s (fik.r) - f{kt.,)k,.r, /'(fc,)) " ht-i ;
(13) bt = ([1 + f'{kt)]/[l + n]) bt-i ,
starting from the exogenously determined initial values ko and bo.
B. Competitive Equilibrium and Efficiency
Following Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), a competitive equilibrium will now be
defined for the Diamond-Tirole Economy in terms of optimality conditions for the consumers
and the producer, the capital market clearing condition, and the growth restriction on bubble
asset holdings/
^Given consumer and producer optimization, and the capital market clearing condition (6), the bubble
asset growth restriction (8) is equivalent to the product market clearing condition (9). To see this, consider
the following sequence of implications in both the forward and reverse directions:
(H-n);;(+i+cj+c?/[l-|-n] = +
(l-t-n)fc(+i + [ty(-S(] + [l-|-r,]s(_i/[l + n] = yt + kt\
(l-l-n)fct+i + [iy,-st] + [l + n]S(-i/[H-n] = iwt + [1 +
(1 -I- n)A;(+i —St + [1 + r(]s(_i/[l + n] = [1 +
(1+ n)A(+i - [6( + [1 + n]A:(+i] + [1 + r(][6t-i-I-[1+ n]/:t]/[l+ n] = [H-rtjA:*;
—bt -l- [1 + + n] = 0.
DEFINITION 1; [Diamond-Tirole Equilibrium Given initial values Atq > 0 and
^ 0 for capital and bubble asset holdings, a sequence (^t, cj, cj, 6f, rt^Wt : t > 1) of
savings levels St, consumption levels cj and cj, capital-labor ratios kt, per capita bubble
asset levels bt, interest rates rt > 0; and wage rates > 0 is a competitive equilibrium
e(^oj '^o) for the per capita Diamond-Tirole Economy if and only if it satisfies the following
four conditions:
• [Consumer Optimization] In each period t>l, the young consumer's choice
vector Xt = solves the lifetime utility maximization problem (1)
conditional on wt and rt+i, i.e., xt = x{wt,rt^i); and each old consumer in period 1
consumes cf = [1 + ri]5o with Sq = s{f{ko) —f'{ko)koyri).
• [Producer Optimization] In each period t > 1, the producer's capital-labor ratio
choice kt solves the necessary and sufficient conditions (4) and (5) for profit
maximization conditional upon Wt and rt.
• [Capital Market Clearing] In each period t>l, condition (6) holds.
• [Bubble Asset Growth Restriction] In each period t > I, per capita bubble asset
holdings grow in accordance with condition (8).
A competitive equilibrium e(ko^bo) for the Diamond-Tirole Economy will be called a
stationary competitive equilibrium if kt = ko and bt = bo for each period t>l.
Given various regularity conditions,® Tirole (1985) proves that the Diamond-Tirole Econ
omy has two distinct stationary competitive equilibria: a Pareto inefficient equilibrium char
acterized by the interest rate r = f and zero bubble asset holdings; and a Pareto efficient
"golden-rule" equilibrium characterized by the biological interest rate r —n and positive
®As in Diamond (1965), Tirole (1985) assumes that there exists a unique r satisfying s(iy(r),r) —[1 +
n]^(r), with f < n. Also, as detailed inSection AoftheAppendix, Tirole imposes several additional technical
regularity conditions on the savings function s(*) and the production function /(•).
bubble asset holdings. Consequently, the simple inclusion of a bubble asset (e.g., fiat money
or government bonds) is not enough to guarantee that all competitive equilibria are Pareto
efficient.
For later purposes, it is useful to provide here a brief review of the efficiency and stability
properties which Tirole establishes for these two stationary competitive equilibria.
Given the stationary interest rate r = f, the optimal consumer and producer choice
variables and the wage rate are stationary, and are given by x = x(u;(f),f), k = fc(f), and
w = ti;(f). It is easily established that the sequence e(k,0) = (5,^,0,f, tD : i > 1) satisfies
the conditions in Definition 1 characterizing a stationary competitive equiUbrium. Hereafter
this bubbleless stationary competitive equilibrium will be abbreviated by e.
The allocation achieved under the bubbleless stationary equilibrium e is not Pareto ef
ficient. Since f < n, a suitably small reduction in the equilibrium capital-labor ratio k in
any given period t*, offset by a corresponding increase in bubble asset holdings, permits an
increased stationary level of "net output" y —nk m all periods t > t*. This in turn implies
that young and old age per-capita consumptions can also be increased in all periods t > t*\
see condition (9).
Given the stationary interest rate r = the optimal consumer and producer choice
variables and the wage rate take on the stationary values = a;(if;(n),n), k^ = k{n), and
Define —5(ii^(n),u) —[1 + 'n]k(n). Although the nonnegativity of 6" is
not established by Tirole (1985), it can be shown that 6" is actually strictly positive.® It
is then easily verified that the sequence e'^ (fc'^ ,6") = (a;", fc", : t > I) satisfies all
of the conditions in Definition 1 characterizing a stationary competitive equilibrium. The
allocation generated under e(^:", 6") is the Pareto efficient allocation 3delding maximum net
output y—nk in each period t>l. Hereafter the equilibrium e"(A:", 6") will be abbreviated
by e".
®Since the proof isnot entirely straightforward, it is given in Section Aofthe Appendix.
Finally, given any initial capital-labor ratio ko > 0, there exists a maximum feasible value
bo for the initial bubble asset holdings such that the following two results are true. First,
given any bo in [0, bo), there exists a unique competitive equilibriume(fco) ^)j this equilibrium
in Pareto inefficient, and it converges to the Pareto inefficient bubbleless stationary compet
itive equilibrium Second, there exists a unique competitive equilibrium e{ko^bo); this
equiUbrium is Pareto efficient, and it converges to the Pareto efficient stationary competitive
equilibrium e".
3. PASSIVE MEDIATION IN THE DIAMOND-TIROLE ECONOMY
The Diamond-Tirole Economy does not include an explicit intermediating institution.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to consider intermediation as a distinct function performed
separately from production. The production function is that of transforming the capital
and labor inputs into output. The intermediation function is that of obtaining savings for
investment and consumption loans, and of fulfilling outstanding savings contract obligations.
Hereafter we use the term "intermediary" to describe the unit performing the intermediation
function.
The Diamond-Tirole Economy differs from the Diamond (1965) model of a private pro
duction economy in one crucial respect; The market clearing condition for capital is relaxed
to allow for consumption loans. Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1, the Diamond market
clearing condition St = Kt+i is replaced by the condition St = Bf\-Kt+i' From the viewpoint
of young consumers, Bt represents the portion of their savings held in the form of a bubble
asset, e.g., fiat money or bonds. From the viewpoint of the intermediary, Bt represents the
portion of his deposits not invested in capital.
^"^The equilibrium e{ko,bo) fails to be Pareto efficient because it is characterized by capital overaccumu-
lation in every period—cf. Tirole (1985, Figure 1, p. 1505). A suitably small increase in the bubble asset
holdings offset by a decrease in the capital labor ratio kt for any period t permits an increase in period
t net output yt—nArt+i, and hence also in the per capita consumptions for the young and old consumers in
all periods t' > t.
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-Figure 1 About Here-
The Diamond-Tirole intermediary is thus potentially able to use Bt to finance consump
tion loans. However, as seen in Section 2, the passive financing of consumption loans is not
enough, in and of itself, to guarantee a Pareto efficient outcome.
The Diamond-Tirole intermediary in period t is obliged to make a principal-plus-interest
payment [1 -l-r<]5«_i to generation t —1 old consumers . The intermediary also receives from
the producer a demand for capital, Kt+i- Incoming receipts consist of the savings deposits St
received from young consumers and the principal plus interest repayment [1 -1- rt]Kt received
from the producer for capital borrowed in period t —1. The net earnings of the intermediary
in period t are therefore given by
(14) II( = + [1 rt]Kt " [1 + —• '^^ '<+1
= [iSt —Kt+i " 1 + —Kt
= - [1 + .
The restriction (7) imposed by Tirole on the growth of the bubble asset holdings Bt
now takes on a new light. Given this restriction, the intermediary's net earnings (14) are
forced to be zero in every period i > 1. In imposing condition (7), Tirole (1985, p. 1503)
correctly notes that physical capital and the bubble asset must earn the same yield in order
for both assets to be held in equiUbrium. However, the equality of these yields does not, in
and of itself, imply that condition (7) must hold. Rather, condition (7) holds if and only if
an additional special-case restriction is invoked: namely, the bubble asset remains in fixed
supply.
To understand this, let denote the quantity of the bubble asset supplied by the
intermediary in period i —1, and let denote the price of the bubble asset during period
t —l measured in units of good t —l. Because the bubble asset is used exclusively to finance
consumption loans, it follows that Bt-i = For the bubble asset to be held at the
11
same time capital loans are being made, the bubble asset must earn the same rate of return
as capital, meaning that Pt/Pt-i = [1 + ^t]- Consequently, the following sequence of equalities
must hold in the forward and reverse directions:
(15) Ilf = Bt - [I +
As condition (15) makes clear,whetheror not Tirole's condition (7) holds, and hence whether
or not the intermediary has nonzero net earnings, depends upon whether or not the supply
of the bubble asset is fixed.
As shown in Section 2, Footnote 7, Tirole's condition (7) is equivalent to the assumption
that supply equals demand in the product market. Thus, if Tirole's condition need not
hold, product market clearing in this strong supply-equal-demand form need not hold either
(cf. Footnote 6). In fact, the intermediary's ability to achieve positive net earnings depends
upon his ability to generate an excess supply in the product market. When there is an excess
demand in the product market, Bt is strictly less than [1 + rt]Bt-i and the intermediary's
net earnings Ilf are negative. This situation cannot arise in competitive equilibrium because
the intermediary is unable to fulfill all contract obligations when net earnings are negative.
However, when there is an excess supply in the product market, i.e., when Bt is strictly
greater than [1 + rt]Bt-i, the intermediary's net earnings are positive. In this case, the
intermediary can meet all contract obligations. Having met all outstanding obligations, the
intermediary is entitled to keep, as profit, the excess supply generated.
In short, once the assumption of a fixed bubble asset supply is relaxed, the intermediary
is able to achieve positive net earnings. Is it reasonable to suppose that the coordination of
trade and credit transactions remains his sole objective? The intermediary's stance toward
riet earnings must now be clarified in order for the model to be complete.
12
The next Section sets out a generahzation of the Diamond-Tirole Economy—referred
to as the "Brokered Economy"—which explicitly includes a corporate intermediary with
an earnings objective. The intermediary is not required to keep the bubble asset in fixed
supply. The efficiency implications of active earnings-driven intermediation are explored for
the Brokered Economy in Section 5.
4. THE BASIC BROKERED ECONOMY
Consider an economy, hereafter referred to as the "Brokered Economy," where all
trade outside the labor market is mediated by an intermediary. Consumers have the oppor
tunity to purchase two assets from the intermediary: (1) shares of stock in the intermediary;
and (2) bonds. There are no risk differences between stock shares and bonds, so that con
sumers base their asset choices only upon expected rate of return.
Each young consumer in generation t>l demands Of shares ofstock and Xf bonds, to be
sold in the subsequent period. The period t prices of stock shares and bonds in terms of good
t are pf and i > 1, and are taken as given by consumers. The intermediary distributes
all net earnings back to consumers as dividends in accordance with the following dividend
policy: Each share of stock purchased during period t entitles the owner to a dividend dt+i
in period i -f 1.
Let denote the dividend per share expected by a representative young consumer in
generation t > 1. The utility maximization problem of this price-taking young consumer
then takes the form
(16) max£/(cj,cj+i)
with respect to subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
cj = - p^^ef - p^Xf ;
~ Pi+\^t "f" i
13
^ 0, c^^.1 > 0 .
No sign restrictions are placed on Of or Xf, implying that short sales are allowed for both
stock shares and bonds. Consequently, assuming all prices are positive, no finite solution
exists for problem (16) unless stock shares and bonds have a common rate of return, i.e.,
unless
(1'^ ) \Pt+i + ^t+i\/Pt —Pt+i/Pt —[1 +
for some > —1. Given positive prices, condition (17), and the assumed regularity
conditions on preferences (Footnote 4, Section 2), there exists a determinate solution for the
planned savings level St = {c\ —Wt] and consumption levels (cj,c^+i) as a function of the
wage Wt and the common rate of return rt+i. However, the consumer is indifferent among all
stock-bond combinations which yield this planned savings level. Let this determinate
solution for the savings and consumption levels (5t,cJ,cJ^.i) be denoted by^^
(18) (5(uJi, rt+i), c^(wt, rt+i), c^(wt, r,+i)) .
In the initial period 1, each old consumer owns a nonnegative number of stock shares
and a nonnegative number Aq of bonds. Thus, the aggregate quantities of stock shares and
bonds in existence in period 1 are 0o = LqOq and Aq = LqXq. Each old consumer is entitled
to the period 1 dividend diOo and also earns income in period 1 by selling the stock shares
and bonds owned. Thus, each old consumer in period 1 plans to consume
(19) + +
It will be assumed that this planned consumption derives from an (unmodelled) time 0
choice problem of the form (16), and that a viability condition of the form (17) holds also
^^The savings function s(-) in (18) coincides with the savings function for the Diamond-Tirole Economy
derived in Section 2. Recalling the definitions for the factor-price frontier functions t«(r) and k{r) given in
Part A of Section 2, it will be assumed here as for the Diamond-Tirole Economy that there exists a unique
f satisfying s(uj(r), r) = [1 -|- n]fc(r), with r < n. Also, as noted in Part B ofSection 2, Diamond (1965) and
Tiroje (1985) impose several additional technical regularity conditions on the savings function s(-) and the
production function /(•). These regularity conditions are also assumed to hold for the Brokered Economy.
A detailed statement of these regularity conditions can be found in Part A of the Appendix.
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for t = 0. Consequently, the planned consumption of old agents in period 1 can equivalently
be expressed in the form
(20) c\ = [1 + ri]5{u;o,ri) ,
where Wq = /(Atq) —/'(fco)fco is the wage received by the old agent in youth, and the savings
function 5(') coincides with the savings function determined for each generation i > 1 agent
in (18).
The problem facing the producer in the Brokered Economy is identical to that facing
the producer in the Diamond-Tirole Economy. An initial positive capital-labor ratio ko is
assumed to be historically given. In each period t > 1, the profit-maximizing producer has
the opportunity to rent capital from the intermediary to be used as an input to production
along with the labor Lt supplied inelasticUly by young consumers. The rental capital Kf
which the producer plans to employ during period t is demanded from the intermediary
during period t —1. As in Tirole (1985), it will be eissumed that the rate of interest charged
to the producer for the rental of this capital is the same as the rate of return on savings.
Consequently, the producer plans to pay the intermediary a principal-plus-interest payment
1 + during period t.
The intermediary's period t net earnings lit are equal to the quantity of good t remaining
in the intermediary's possession after all contract obligations are fulfilled. These net earnings
are determined by a consideration of the intermediary's stock, bond, and capital transactions.
Let and Af = denote the total amounts of stock shares and bonds which
the intermediary plans to supply to consumers in period i, and let denote the amount
of rental capital which the intermediary plans to supply to the producer for use in period
As a result of stock share sales and purchases, the intermediary in period t plans to
receive pfQf units of good from generation i young consumers and to deliver 0?_i units of
is assumed throughout the remainder of the paper that initial supplies for stock shares, bonds, and
per capita capital coincide with the historically given values; i.e., 0g = ©o, Ag = Aq, and K§/Lo = ko.
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good t to generation t —1 old consumers. Moreover, as a result of bond sales and purchases,
the intermediary in period t plans to receive p^Af units of good from generation t young
consumers and to deliver units of good t to generation i —1 old consumers. Finally,
as a result of capital rental transactions, the intermediary in period t plans to receive a
principal-plus-interest payment [1 from the producer and deliver capital Kf+i
producer to be employed in the subsequent period i + 1. Consequently, the intermediary's
planned period t net earnings take the form
(21) n, = pH©? - 0?-il + p'[A? - AU] - [KUi - (1 + rt)Kn , <> 1 •
In the Diamond-Tirole Economy, only one asset—the "bubble asset"—is used to finance
consumption loans. In the Brokered Economy there are two assets which the intermediary
could use to finance consumption loans: namely, stocks and bonds. To achieve a more direct
comparison with the Diamond-Tirole Economy, it is useful to place a financing restriction
on the intermediary:
(22) Ki = Pt-i^t-1 and Bt-i = 5 ^ > 1 •
Condition (22) guarantees that the intermediary finances his capital loans Kf solely by means
of bond transactions and his consumption loans Bt-i solely by means of stock transactions.
Given the viability condition (17) on prices and interest rates and the financing condition
(22), the intermediary's planned period t net earnings (21) further reduce to
(23) n, = pn0?-e?-i]
= — 1 + Bt-i 5 i ^ 1 •
By assumption, the intermediary plans to distribute his period t net earnings He as div
idends to generation t —I old shareholders, so that 11^ = Consequently, it follows
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from (23) that Tirole's bubble asset growth restriction (7) holds ex post for the Brokered
Economy if young consumers correctly anticipate their per share dividend payments and all
of the intermediary's planned stock, bond, and capital transactions are realized. Note, how
ever, that Tirole's restriction is not an ex ante restriction on the intermediary's behavior.
Moreover, in the Brokered Economy, Tirole's restriction does not imply that the intermedi
ary's net earnings are zero. Rather, assuming positive prices, it follows fro,m (23) that the
net earnings of the intermediary are zero if and only if the bubble asset is in fixed supply.
The Brokered Economy is not yet complete. An objective for the intermediary needs
to be specified, along with market clearing conditions. In standard overlapping generations
models, these two specifications have traditionally been equated; the intermediary is assumed
to be a passive Walrasian Auctioneer concerned only with trade and credit coordination. As
will now be clarified, the alternative specification of an active intermediary motivated by
earnings rather than coordination has immediate and dramatic implications for the efficient
operation of the economy.
5. MODELLING THE INTERMEDIARY: EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS
A. The Intermediary as a Passive Coordinator
Suppose the Brokered Economy intermediary behaves as a passive Walrasian Auc
tioneer. That is, he sets stock share prices, bond prices, and interest rates, and then stailds
ready to mediate all resulting trade and credit transactions. Specifically, trades for existing
stock shares and goods are brokered, and savings are channeled into capital investment and
consumption loans. The sole objective of the intermediary is to coordinate these transactions
so that supply equals demand in all markets.
The stock shares supplied by the intermediary in period t are given by the stock shares
0?_i which generation t —1 old agents sell back to the intermediary in period t. Bonds AJ
are issued as needed to meet demand Af. The capital and product markets are the same as
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for the Diamond-Tirole Economy. In analytical terms, then, the intermediary's coordination
objective implies that he sets prices and interest rates in each period t > 1 so that, in per





plei=p\[9U{l+n)]=p\9t , <>1 ;
pIK = p^,\i ,t>l-
kl = [5,_i - 6,_i]/(l + n) = ki , t>l •,
y, + k' = [1 + + cj + cj/[l +«],<>!.
Given any positive price and interest rate sequences satisfying the viability condition
(17), it follows from (23) that the intermediary's per capita net earnings ttj =
the form
(28) TT, = pl[ei-6l_J{l + n)]
— "I""I" ~ [(^ "I" ^<)/(^ "I" •
Condition (24) implies that these net earnings are zero in each period t > 1. Since dividend
payments consist entirely of the intermediary's net earnings, per share dividend expectations
are fulfilled only if these expectations are zero.
The optimization problems faced by the producer and consumers in the Brokered Econ
omy coincide with the optimization problems faced by the producer and consumers in the
Diamond-Tirole Economy once the identification $t = [cj —wt] is made for the Brokered
Economy and the viability condition (17) is assumed. Also, using the capital market clear
ing condition (26), and assuming consumer and producer optimization, it is straightforward
to show (cf. Footnote 7) that the product market clearing condition (27) is equivalent to
Tirole's bubble asset growth restriction (8).
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In summary, when the market clearing conditions (24) through (27) are imposed on the
Brokered Economy, the resulting "Walrasian" Brokered Economy is essentially equivalent to
the Diamond-Tirole Economy.^^ One implication of this equivalence is that the Walrasian.
Brokered Economy supports the Pareto inefficient outcome e as a competitive equilibrium.
Another implication of this equivalence is that the intermediary implicitly present in the
Diamond-Tirole economy is a passive agent who does not seek out earnings opportunities.
When compared to intermediaries observed in society, such behavior must be cojisidered
pecuUar. Why would an intermediary restrict itself to zero net earnings when positive net
earnings are possible?
As indicated by (28), the Brokered Economyintermediary must be able to issue additional
shares of stock (bubble asset) if he is to obtain positive net earnings. However, there does
not seem to be any reason why stock shares should be in fixed supply. Instead, one would
think the intermediary would take advantage of the opportunity to increase net earnings by
issuing additional stock shares up to the point where this dilution had perceived adverse
consequences on net earnings.
B. The Intermediary as an Active Earnings Seeker
Suppose the passive trade-coordinating Walrasian intermediary is replaced by an ac
tive earnings-driven intermediary who is able to issue additional shares of stock. Two basic
possibilities can be considered: the earnings-driven intermediary is a price-setter; or the
earnings-driven intermediary is a quantity-setter who takes prices as given.
The former possibility is extremely attractive. After all, the original motivation for
explicitly introducing the intermediary was to put a corporate business suit on the Walrasian
auctioneer, and the auctioneer is most certainly a price-setter rather than a price-taker.
^^Specifically, any equilibrium (s<,C| > 1) for a Diamond-Tirole Economy with initial con
ditions of the form A?o > 0 and 6o > 0 is an equilibrium sequence of real outcomes for a Walrasian Brokered
Econonyr with initial conditions of the form fco > 0 and (6o,^o,Ao) > 0, and vice versa, where St = [cj—wj]
for the Brokered Economy.
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Nevertheless, dropping the price-taking assumption represents a radical departure from the
Diamond-Tirole Economy and is best left to a separate study.
How, then, might a plausible earnings objective be specified for the Brokered Economy
intermediary, assuming that he is to be modeled as a price taker?
In order to adhere as closely as possible to the Diamond-Tirole framework, the supply-
equal-demand equilibrium conditions (25), (26), and (27) for the bond, capital, and prod
uct markets in the Walrasian Brokered Economy will be retained for the general Brokered
Economy.^"* However, the stock market clearing condition (24) with fixed stock share supply
will be replaced by the weaker requirement
(29) Q,t>l .
Thus, the real vdhie of excess stock share supply must still equal zero in every period t, as
an equilibrium condition. However, the supply of stock shares issued by the intermediary to
young consumers in period t is no longer constrained to equal the number of shares which
the intermediary buys back from the old generation t —1 shareholders. Rather, this supply
is now to be determined by the behavioral specification of an earnings objective for the
price-taking intermediary.
An immediate and important implication of this change in model specification is that
the Pareto inefficient allocation associated with the bubbleless Diamond-Tirole stationary
competitive equilibrium e cannot be supported as a competitive equilibrium for the Brokered
Economy under any reasonable specification for the intermediary's, earnings objective. The
equilibrium e is characterized by the stationary rate of return f < n and zero net earnings
noted in Section 3, excess supply in the product market could feasibly occur in the Diamond-Tirole
Economy because the intermediary could accumulate positive net earnings (positive amounts ofgood) which
he does not distribute back to consurners. Consequently, the supply-equal-demand equilibrium condition for
theDiamond-Tirole product market isoverly restrictive. In the Brokered Economy, however, allnet earnings
are distributed back to consuniers in the period in which they are accumulated. Thus, all goods produced
in any period t are acquired by consumers through wages, dividends, and net receipts from stock and bond
transactions. The supply-equal-demand condition (27) is therefore an appropriate product market clearing
condition for the Brokered Economy.
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in each period t > 1. In this equilibrium the intermediary issues no consumption loans.
However, given f, the intermediary in the Brokered Economy would perceive the possibility
of increasing his net earnings 11^ in each period t by switching to an intermediation plan
imder which some consumption loans are issued.
To see this, suppose the price-taking intermediary decides to sell an additional fixed
real amount of stock Au = to each young consumer in each generation ^ > 1 at the
given rate of return f, where all receipts from these stock sales are to be used to finance
consumption loans. In the initial period 1, the intermediary would then expect to obtain the
positive net earnings increment LiAu, for the liability incurred by the additional stock sale
does not come due until the following period. Moreover, in every subsequent period t > 2
the intermediary would expect to obtain the net earnings increment LtAv —[1 + f]Lt-iAv,
or n — r which is positive since n > f. Thus, anticipated net earnings under this
alternative intermediation plan would be higher in each period <> 1.
In short, under any reasonable specification of an earnings objective, the intermediary
in the Brokered Economy would desire to sell more stock shares at r than consumers would
desire to purchase. It follows that f cannot be a stationary equilibrium rate of return for
the Brokered Economy.
Nevertheless, the concrete specification of a reasonable earnings objective for the price-
taking Brokered Economy intermediary is not a simple matter. The usual objective assumed
for a price-taking corporation in standard general equilibrium contexts is the maximization
of present-value profits. This specification is problematic for a price-taking corporation in
an overlapping generations economy. The crux of the difficulty is^ an ambiguity in the very
meaning of "profits." Financial flows are staggered for the Brokered Economy intermediary;
revenues and costs associated with any one transaction are separated in time. The period t
profit recognized by the intermediary thus depends upon whether the intermediary accounts
for profit using "accrual-basis" or "cash-basis" accounting.
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Underaccrual-basis accounting, the revenues from a particular transaction are onlyrecog
nized in a profit calculationif all of the associated costs of the transaction are also recognized,
and vice versa. Accrual-basis profit on any transaction made by the intermediary must equal
zero, for each transaction generates a revenue which is exactly offset by a cost in present
value terms. In contrast, under cash-basis accounting, period t profit is recognized as the
net value of period t economic flows. Thus, the intermediary's period t cash-basis profit is
equal to his net earnings lit as defined by (21). Period t cash-basis profit is the quantity of
good t which the intermediary controls during period t in excess of that required to fulfill
all period t contract obligations. To avoid confusion between accrual-basis and cash-basis
profit, the term '"net earnings" will hereafter be used in place of "cash-basis profit."
The "profit" opportunities perceived by the Brokered Economy intermediary under the
two differentaccountingmethods are dramatically different. For example, if the intermediary
were interested in maximizing present value accrual-basis profit, he would be indifferent
among all feasible intermediation plans; for each such plan generates zero present value
accrual-basis profit. Nevertheless, different feasible intermediation plans generate different
streams of net earnings (potential dividend payments). Consequently, if the intermediary
focuses on net earnings, i.e., on dividend payments to shareholders, he will presumably not
be indifferent regarding his choice of a feasible intermediation plan.
We conclude from these observations that the objective of the Brokered Economy in
termediary is more plausibly specified as a concern for net earnings (dividend payments to
shareholders) rather than as a concern for accrual-bcLsis profits. As a preliminary step in
formulating this objective, we first provide a more careful definition for an "intermediation
plan." Attention is restricted to plans conditioned on price and interest rate sequences sat
isfying the viability condition (17) in each period t. The intermediary's behavior in the face
of nonviable price and interest rate sequences is irrelevant, since such sequences will never
occur in equilibrium. ^
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Given any viable price and interest rate sequences, it follows from (28) that the interme
diary's period t per capita net earnings TTf can be expressed as a function
(30) 7r((b,p^) = ht- [Pi/(1 +
of the sequence b = (61,62,...) of per capita bubble asset investments (consumption loans)
made by the intermediary, with 60 > 0 historically given, and the sequence = (Po?Pi5 •••)
of stock share prices the intermediary takes as given. In each period i > 1, the intermediary
chooses the number of stock shares and bonds to supply to consumers in order to finance
his capital and bubble asset investments. However, it is clear from (30) that the sequence b
of per capita bubble asset investments chosen by the intermediary is of primary importance
in the determination of his net earnings. This sequence will be called the intermediary's
intermediation plan.
Given any viable price sequence p^, what constitutes a "feasible" intermediation plan?
The intermediary must fulfill all contract obligations. For all contract obligations to be
fulfilled, the intermediary must receive enough good in each period to meet all outstanding
obligations. This implies that the intermediary must choose an intermediation plan b such
that 7ri(b, p^) > 0 holds for all t>l.
In the absence of any additional constraint on the intermediation plans, however, the
intermediary would incorrectiy perceive the possibility of obtaining arbitrarily large net
earnings in each period i > 1 by rolling over ever-larger amounts of debt. Rationally per
ceivedquantity constraints ("no-Ponzi-game" conditions) are commonly used in overlapping
generations contexts to prevent price-taking altruistic consumers with bequest motives from
choosing nonfeasible "optimal" paths with exploding debt; see, e.g., Blanchard and Fis
cher (1989, pp. 49-50). Apparently this kind of constraint also needs to be imposed on the
Brokered Economy intermediary.
We therefore assume that the intermediary restricts his choice of an intermediation plan
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to the set B of per capita bubble asset sequences b which do not diverge to infinity.^®
As estabUshed in Section B of the Appendix, this assumption is rather innocuous; for the
intermediary can recognize a -priori that a per capita bubble asset sequence b which diverges
to infinity could never be actualized in any equilibrium for the Brokered Economy.
In summary, given a viable price sequence p^, the set F(p^) of feasible intermediation
plans b is defined to be the collection of all nondivergent intermediation plans yielding
nonnegative net earnings in each period i > 1. Formally,
(il) F(p^) = {heB: 7ri(b, p^) > 0 for all t > 1}.
The intermediary has considerable flexibility in distributing net earnings over time. How
ever, each shareholder cares only about the net earnings distributed during his lifetime. How
is the distribution of net earnings to be determined?
Here we consider one illustrative example of a dividend distribution objective for the
intermediary which takes into account the varied interests of all shareholders. Specifically,
we consider a version of Rawls' (1971) max-min "Difference Principle." We assume that
the intermediary seeks to maximize the minimum per capita dividend distributed to
shareholders over time. As will be shown below (Corollary 1), this dividend distribution
objective implies that the market value of the corporate intermediary in any competitive
equilibrium attains its maximum feasible value in each period <> 1.
Formally, the dividend distribution objective of the intermediary takes the form
(32) max inf7r((b;p^).
^ ^ beF(p»)t>i ^
The (possibly empty) solution set for problem (32) will be denoted by 5(p^).
A definition of competitive equiUbrium will how be given for the Brokered Economy
real sequence (61,621 • ••) "diverges to infinity" if, for every real number v, there exists a subscript t
such that |6,| > r for all s > t. The set B of nondivergent sequences thus contains bounded sequences as
well as, e.g., cyclic sequences with ever increasing amplitudes.
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which includes the dividend objective of the intermediary as well as the utility objectives of
consumers and the profit objective of the producer.
DEFINITION 2: [Brokered Economy Equilibrium] Let initial values ko > 0 and
ft>o,Oo,^o) > 0 for per capita capital, per capita bubble asset, per capita stock shares, and
per capita bonds be given. A sequence {vtyd^ykf^nit^pt : t > 1) consisting of consumer
choice vectors Vt = expected per share dividends d\, producer per capita
capital demands kf, intermediary choice vectors mt = (Ot,Xt,k',bt), and price-interest rate
vectors pt = ^ is a Brokered Economy equilibrium e(A:o, 6o,0oi Aq) if
the following seven conditions are met:
• [Consumer Optimization] In each period t > 1, fit the lifetime
utility maximization problem (16) conditional on wt, pf, pf, Pt+i, Pt+u ^t+n'
consumption cf of each generation 0 old consumer in period 1 satisfies cj =
1+ ri]s(f{ko) —f'(ko)ko,ri) with the savings function 5(-) determined as in (20).
• [Producer Optimization] In each period<> 1^ the producer's per capita capital
demandkf solves the necessary and sufficient conditions (8) and (9) for profit
maximization conditional on Wt andrf
• [Intermediary Optimization] The intermediary chooses a feasible intermediation
plan b which maximizes the minimum per capita dividend distributed over time; i.e.,
b GB{p').
• [Market Clearing Conditions] In each period i the bond, capital, and product
markets satisfy the market clearing conditions (25), (26), and (27), and the stock
market satisfies the market clearing condition (29).
• [Fulfilled Expectations] In each period t>l, the expected per share dividend d\
coincides with the actual per share dividend.
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Price-Interest Rate Viability Condition] The rate of return paid by borrowers is
equal to the rate of return received by lenders; i.e., condition (17) holds for all <> 0.
• [Financing Condition] Capital loans are onlyfinanced using bond transactions, and
consumption loans are only financed using stock share transactions; i.e., condition
(22) holds for all t > 1.
A Brokered Economy equilibrium e{ko,bo,6oy Xq) will be called a stationary Brokered
Economy equilibrium if kt = ko and bt = 6o for all t > 1.
Given the defining conditions for a Brokered Economy equilibrium, the stationarity re
striction on the per capita capital stock kt is equivalent to assuming the stationarity of the
interest rate r^. Stationarity of rt and kt in turn implies the stationarity of the real wage Wt
and the savings and consumption levels chosen by consumers in each period t> I,
where st = [cj —wt].
Using the definition for a Brokered Economy equilibrium, the following three theorems
are obtained. Proofs are given in Section C of the Appendix.
THEOREM 1: Given any positive price sequence and any initial per capita bub
ble asset level bo > 0, the solution set 5(p^) for the intermediary's optimization problem
(32) is nonempty if and only if the sequence [St) diverges to infinity and the sequence
••' 9i]^) do6s not diverge to infinity, where
(33) qt = pf/(l + f > 1,
and
(34) = 1 + + qtqt-i + ... + [qtQt-i' " Q2] i t >2,
with 5i = 1.
The price conditions appearing in Theorem 1 are the Brokered Economy analogs of the
well-known Cass-Balasko-Shell price conditions shown by Balasko and Shell (1980, Proposi-
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tion 5.6, pp. 296-297) to be necessary and sufficient for Pareto efficiency in the context of a
pure exchange overlapping generations economy. Balasko and Shell do not provide an eco
nomic interpretation for their price conditions. The interesting point here is that the analogs
of the Balasko-Shell price conditions now appear as necessary and sufficient conditions for
the earnings-driven intermediary ^to have a solution to his dividend distribution problem.
Theorem 1 is crucial for the proof of the next theorem.
THEOREM 2: There exists at least one stationary equilibrium for the Brokered Economy.
Every stationary equilibrium generates the same real outcome (3,c^,c^, fc, 6, r, u;), where s
= [c^ —ii;]; namely, the Pareto efficient real outcome e"(A:",6") constituting the golden-
rule equilibrium for the Diamond-Tirole Economy. In particular, the unique stationary
equilibrium interest rate r for the Brokered Economy is given by r = n.
Theorem 2 states there that the Pareto efficient golden-rule equilibrium for the Diamond-
Tirole Economy is the unique real outcome possible for the Brokered Economy in any sta
tionary equilibrium. In particular, the Pareto inefficient stationary equilibrium e for the
Diamond-Tirole Economy is not supported as a stationary equibrium real outcome for the
Brokered Economy. As noted in Part B of Section 2, all Pareto inefficient equilibria for the
Diamond-Tirole Economy converge to e; hence one might surmise that the elimination of
this Pareto inefficient outcome would lead to the restoration of a First Welfare Theorem.
The next theorem shows that this is indeed the case.
THEOREM 3: Every Brokered Economy equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Theorem 3 establishes that the inefficiency observed in the Diamond-Tirole Economy
is completely eliminated if the intermediary is modelled as an earnings-driven corporation
which attempts to maximize the minimum per capita dividend distributed to shareholders
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over time. The final result follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 3.
COROLLARY 1: Given any equilibrium for the Brokered Economy, the market value
Bt = Pt^t of the corporate intermediary in each period t > I is positive and takes on its
maximum feasible value. Moreover, the stock share price Pt in each period t > I differs
from its fundamental value—i.e., the present value of the current and future per share stock
dividends (dr'^ r > i)— if and only if the sequence ([qtqt^i •••?i]^) does not converge to zero
as t oo, where qt is defined as in (33).
It follows from the first statement of Corollary 1 that the max-min dividend objective
of the intermediary is consistent with the goal of market value maximization. The second
statement establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a bubble on
the stock shares issued by the intermediary.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper establishes that the inefficiency properties exhibited by the Diamond-
Tirole Economy under standard competitive assumptions are dramatically altered when a
price-taking earnings-driven corporate intermediary is introduced into the model. In par
ticular, the Pareto inefficient stationary equilibrium for the Diamond-Tirole Economy is no
longer tenable. These findings indicate that the inefficiency observed in previous overlap
ping generations models with production may not be the reflection of an intrinsic market
failure. Rather, the observed inefficiency could be due to an incompleteness in the model
specification—the presumed inability of private agents to exploit the earnings opportunities
associated with incurring and forever roUing over debt.
For future studies, however, we believe that modelling intermediaries as piice-setting
agents will be more fruitful. The Walrasian Auctioneer is, after all, a price-setting agent.
However, the motives of the intermediary must be extended beyond those currently asso
ciated with the W^asian Auctioneer. .Real-world intermediaries are not merely trade and
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credit coordinators. They set prices, interest rates, and other borrowing and lending terms
with the primary objective of obtaining earnings. In short, real-world counterparts of the
Walrasian Auctioneer are dressed in corporate business suits.
Our work also suggests that some restrictions on free entry and debt accumulation will
have to be imposed on the intermediation sector in order to give private agents both the
incentive and the abiUty to create and maintain viable corporate intermediary institutions.
Real-world intermediaries such as banks and savings and loan institutions are already sub
ject to such restrictions, e.g., charter and reserve requirements. Future studies along the
lines suggested in this paper might clarify the reasons for the historical emergence of these
regulations.
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Figure 1: The Diamond-Tirole Economy
APPENDIX
A. Proof that 6" > 0
As noted in Section 2, Part B, Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985) ctssume that the equa
tion 0 = z(r) has a unique solution f, where
(35) z{r) = [Lt^is{w{r)^r) - Ltk(r)]/Lt = 5(iy(r), r)/[l + u] - A:(r)
denotes the excess supply of savings per young consumer when each optimizing consumer
and producer is faced with the interest rate r. In addition, in order to focus on the case
where inefficiency is possible, they assume that f < n.
It will first be shown that, under the Diamond-Tirole assumptions, the excess supply of
savings z{r) is an increasing function of r at r = f; i.e., 0 < z\f). Using this result, it will
then be shown that
(36) 0 < z[r) for all r satisfying f < r .
Hence, in particular, 0 < z{n) = 6"/[l + n]^
Given the stationary interest rate f, producer optimization in the Diamond-Tirole Econ
omy implies that the capital-labor ratio k and the wage rate w satisfy f = f'(k) and w =




fc'(f) = 1/nm) ;
u;'(f) = -k{f) • f"{k{f)) • ifc'(f) .
Using conditions (37) and (38), one obtains
z'{f) = [5u,(if;(f), f)w'{f) + Sj.{w(f), f)]/[l + n]—k'{f)
= [5r(u^(r),f) - 5^(u;(f),f)fe(f)/"(fc(f))fc'(f)]/[l + n
(39) = [Sr{w(f), f) - Syj{w(f), f)fc(r)]/[l + 7Z] - k'(r).
- m
Diamond and Tirole place a condition on the relative slopes of the capital market supply
and demand curves along any competitive equilibrium path; see (Diamond, 1965, eq.(ll),
p. 1133). In particular, for the unique stationary competitive equilibrium e = e(/i:(f),0)
associated with f, this condition reduces to
(40) [f"{k{f))s^{w(f), f)]/[l + n - f"(k(f))sr(w{f), f)] < 0 .
Moreover, Diamond and Tirole assume that consumption is a normal good in each period
of life for each agent, which implies 0 < < 1; see (Diamond, 1965, footnote 1). The
numerator in condition (40) is therefore negative. Thus, in order for condition (40) to hold,
the denominator must be positive; i.e.,
(41) [1 + n — f)] > 0 .
Diamond (1965) also assumes that e is locally stable, and he gives a condition (eq.(12),
p. 1134) which is necessary for this to be the case; namely,
(42) I [-^:(r)/"(fc(f))5u,(uj(f),f)]/[l + n -/"(A:(f))s,.(rij(f),f)] 1< 1.
A sufficient condition for the local stability of e is that condition (42) hold with strict
inequality, a condition assumed by Tirole (1985, p. 1502) in his extension of the Diamond
framework. Suppose that this slightly stronger sufficient condition holds.
Then, using conditions (37), (39), (41), and (42) with strict inequality, one obtains the
following series of implications:
^fc(f)/"(fc(f))5it,(iij(f),f)] < [1 + n -
0 < [fc(f)/"(fc(r)su;(iu(r), r) + 1 + n —/"(fc(r)5r(iy(f),f)
0 < [— '^(7^)^(r)/"(^(y^))5u,(f, io(f)) —V(r)[l + n] + k'{r)f"{k(f))sr{w{r), r)
0 < [—fc(^)5u,(^^J(f), f) —^'(r)[l + n] + 3r(iy(f), f)
0 < [sr(^i^(?^),^) —•Sti;(u^(f),f)^(f)]/[1 + n] —k'(r)\
(43) 0 < z'{r).
n
As previously noted, f satisfies 0 = z{t). It follows from (43) that, for some positive e,
0 < z{r) for all r in the interval (r, f + e). Suppose that z(r*) < 0 for some r* satisfying
f + e < r*. By continuity of z(-), this would imply the existence of some r° lying between
f + e and r* which satisfies 0 = ^ contradiction of the assumption that there exists a
unique solution to the equation 0 = z{r).
It follows that condition (36) must hold for the Diamond-Tirole Economy. •
B. Proof that Equilibrium Intermediation Plans Cannot Diverge
Suppose b is an equilibrium intermediation plan for the Brokered Economy which diverges
to infinity. Since the historically given value bo is nonnegative by assumption, it follows from
the expression (28) for the intermediary's per capita net earnings 7rf,.and the necessity to
have TTt > 0 to fulfill all contracts, that the sequence b is nonnegative. Consequently, using
(26), the nonnegative elements bt = [sf —(l + n)/:t+i] of the sequence b must becomeinfinitely
large as t approaches infinity.
The savings of a representative generation t young agent must be nonnegative and
less than his endowment Wt in order for the agent to consume a nonnegative amount of
good when young and when old. Moreover, since the interest rate along any equilibrium
path is positive by assumption, it follows from the producer optimization condition (4) that
the capital-labor ratio kt along any equilibrium path must also be positive. Using these
observations, together with the producer optimization condition (5), one obtains
(44) 0 < st/kt < wt/kt = f{kt)/kt - f'{kt) < f{kt)lkt for all i > 1 .
Since the capital-labor ratio kt is positive along any equilibrium path, ht can only become
infinitely large if St and thus wt both become infinitely large. By conditions (4) and (5), and
the production function restrictions listed in footnote 5, for Wt to become infinitely large as
t approaches infinity, the interest rate rt must approach zero and the capital-labor ratio kt
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must become infinitely large as t approaches infinity. Consequently, by strict concavity of
the production function /(•), and the assumption that f'{k) approaches zeroas k approaches
infinity (cf. footnote 5), the right-hand average product of capital in (44) must approach zero
as i approaches infinity, implying that the ratio St/kt does also.
Finally, consider the expression
(45) St-ifkt-i —1 n kifkt^i = bt-ifkt-i ^ 0 .
Since Sf^i/kt-i approaches zero as t approaches infinity, the (positive) term [1 + n]kt/kt-i
must also approach zero as t approaches infinity in order to have the right term remain
nonnegative for all t. Consequently, kt < kt-i for all sufficiently large t. But this contradicts
the fact, established above, that kt becomes infinitely large as t approaches infinity.
It follows that no equilibrium intermediation plan b for the Brokered Economy can diverge
to infinity. •
C. Proofs for Section 5 Theorems
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: NECESSITY Suppose (St) does not diverge to infinity.
Let Qt = [<lt"for each t > 1, where 6o > 0 denotes initial per capita bubble asset
holdings; and consider the intermediation plan b defined by
(46) bt = M + <ltbt-\ — SiM + i > 1 ,
where M is an arbitrary positive constant. Since qt > 0 for each i > 1, 0 < Qt < Stqibo for
each t >1. It then follows from (46) that 0 <bt < St[M-\-qibo\ for each t> I. Consequently,
the nondivergence of (5^) implies that b lies in the set B of nondivergent sequences. Finally,
it follows from (46) and (28) that the intermediary's per capita net earnings xt satisfy iTt =
M for each ^ > 1. Since M can be chosen arbitrarily large, this implies that the solution set
for the intermediary's optimization problem (32) is empty.
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Thus, the solution set for the the intermediary's optimization problem (32) is nonempty
only if (5t) diverges to infinity.
By assumption, 60 > 0. Given any feasible intermediation plan b, it follows by (28) and
the definition of feasibility that iTt = bt —qtbt-i > 0 for each t > 1. Thus, bt > Qt for
each i > 1. If the nonnegative sequence (Q^) were to diverge to infinity, b would diverge
to infinity and hence be infeasible, a contradiction. Consequently, the set F(p^) of feasible
intermediation plans is nonempty only if (Qf) does not diverge to infinity.
It follows that the solution set for the intermediary's optimization problem (32)—a subset
of F(p^) by construction—is nonempty only if (Q() does not diverge to infinity.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: SUFFICIENCY Suppose {St) diverges to infinity but {Qt)
does not diverge to infinity. Let M denote the largest level of per capita net earnings which
the intermediary can achieve in each period ^ > 1 by means of some feasible intermediation
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plan b. Using (28), this means that b must satisfy —(}tbt-i > M for all t > 1, or
(47) bt > .StM-\-Qt, t>l.
Since the nonnegative sequence (5t) diverges to infinity, and Qt is nonnegative for all i > 1,
b lies in the set B of nondivergent sequences only if M < 0. Thus, the max-min level of per
capita net earnings which the intermediary can feasibly achieve is at most 0.
To establish that the solution set for the intermediary's optimization problem (32) is
nonempty, it thus suffices to show that there exists a feasible intermediation plan which
yields zero per capita net earnings in each period i > 1. Since (Qt) does not diverge to
infinity, such an intermediation plan is found by taking bt = Qtbt-i for all ^ > 1. •
LEMMA 1: If the sequence (5«) diverges to infinity, the max-min level of per capita net
earnings which the intermediary can feasibly achieve is zero.
PROOF: As established in the proof of sufficiency for Theorem 1, the divergence of (i^t)
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implies that M = 0 is the maximum level of per capita net earnings which the intermediary
can feasibly achieve in each period t >1. •.
LEMMA 2: Any equilibrium sequence (s(,cj,/:f, 6^,n,> 1) of real outcomes for
a Brokered Eonomy with initial conditions of the form ko > 0 and > 0 is an
equilibrium for a Diamond-T?irole Economy with initial conditions of the form A:o > 0 and
ib > 0, where St = [cj —'u;^] for the Brokered Economy.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Let fco > Qand (60,^0,-^0) > 0 be given initial conditions for
a Brokered Economy. Consider the general definition for a Brokered Economy equilibrium
presented in Section V. Using the various conditions Usted in this definition, particularly
the capital market clearing and fulfilled expectations conditions, it is straightforward to
show that any Brokered Economy equilibrium paths for kt and bt must satisfy the two basic
state equations (12) and (13) for the Diamond-Tirole Economy; hence they must also be
equiUbrium paths for the Diamond-Tirole Economy.
Given the viability condition on interest rates and prices appearing in the definition of a
Brokered Economy equilibrium, the Brokered Economy equilibrium conditions for consumer
and producer optimization reduce to the conditions for consumer and producer optimization
appearing in the definition of a Diamond-Tirole equilibrium. Consequently, given any paths
for kt and bt which are equilibrium paths for both the Brokered Economy and the Diamond-
Tirole Economy, the equilibrium paths uniquely generated for the variables {st^c]^c^,rt^Wt)
by means of these consumer and producer optimization conditions will be the same. •
LEMMA 3: In order to have a stationary Brokered Economy equilibrium, it is necessary
that rt — n for each i > 1.
PROOF; Suppose e{ko, 60,60^X0) is a stationary Brokered Economy equiHbrium. By defini
tion of stationarity, kt = ^0 for all <> 0. Producer optimization then implies that rt = /'(^o)
for all t > I. Let r = f'{ko). It then follows from the price-interest rate viability condition
appearing in the definition for a Brokered Economy equilibrium that any sequence of stock
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share prices in a stationary equilibrium must satisfy
(48) qt = Pt/{1 + n)p^t-i = a - h7(l + ")],*>!,
where zf = denotes the period t price-normaHzed expected per share dividend, and
a = [1 + r]/[l + n] > 0.
By assumption, the equilibrium stock share price is positive for all i > 1. Moreover,
since equilibrium per capita net earnings Wt must be nonnegative in each period t > 1, it
follows by fulfilled expectations that the equilibrium expected per share dividend must
be nonnegative for each t > 1. Thus, > 0 for all ^ > 1, implying that qt < a for all t>l.
By Theorem 1, the sequence (St) defined as in (34) must diverge to infinity in order for a
solution for the intermediary's problem to exist, and hence in order for a Brokered Economy
equiUbrium to exist. Since qt < a for all t > 1, the divergence of (St) implies the divergence
of (5t), where
(49) = 1+ a + + ... 4" o' ^ ^ ^ ^ 1-
A
However, the sequence (5«) diverges only if a > 1. Thus, r >n must hold.
Next, suppose a > 1, or that r > n. In any Brokered Econorny equilibrium, the actual
per share dividend dt in each period t must equal the expected per share dividend d®. Hence,
since all net earnings are distributed as dividends to old agents in each period t, Wt =
df[6i_i/{l +t^)l for all i > 1. It follows from (28) arid the definition of a that 0 = 6^ —abt-i
for all < > 1. But a > 1 then implies that diverges to infinity (and hence is infeasible)
unless bt = 0. Given a > 1 and bt = 0, it follows from the capital market clearing condition
(26) and producer optimization that there exists an r > u satisfying 5(ti;(r),r) = [H-»^]^(^)5
a violation of a basic Diamond-Tirole assumption retained for the Brokered Economy (see
Section II, Part B). Thus, r = n must hold. •
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 As established by Tirole (1985) and reviewed in Section 2, the
Diamond-Tirole Economy has a unique equiHbrium associated with the stationary interest
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rate = n: namely, the golden-rule equilibrium Consequently, it follows from
Lemmas 2 and 3 that the real outcome associated with any stationary Brokered Economy
equilibrium must coincide with this golden-rule equilibrium.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the Brokered Economy has a stationary
equilibrium with real outcome given by e".
Suppose, then, that the real outcome (^f, cj, cj, kf, r^, Wt) for the Brokered Economy is
given by the stationary golden-rule outcome e" in each period <> 1. Thus, in particular,
= n, kt = k^j and bt = for each i > 1. Suppose in addition that the expected per
share dividend satisfies df = 0 for each i > 1. Let arbitrary initial stock and bond levels
^0 > 0 and Ao > 0 be given. If these initial values are positive, then, using the financing
condition appearing in the definition for a Brokered Economy equilibrium, determine initial
price levels for stock shares and bonds by = b^/Oo and Po = + njk^/Xo. Otherwise, let
these initial price levels take on arbitrary positive values.
Given the stationary (positive) golden-ruleoutcomes k^ and 6", together with the positive
initial price levels pQ and Pq, determine values for the stock price pf, bond price stock
level Of, and bond level A< in each period t > 1 hy the following four auxiliary relations
derived from the viability and financing conditions, together with the assumptions = n
and rf® = 0: .
(50) = [1 + ;
Pt = [1 + ;
A( = [l-\-n]k^/pf .
By construction, the sequences described above satisfy all of the defining conditions for
a stationary Brokered Economy equilibrium with the possible exceptions of intermediary
optimization and fulfilled dividend expectations. - To finish the proof, it remains to show
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that the stationary intermediation plan = 6" lies in the solution set for the intermediary's
optimization problem (32); and, making useof this plan, the per share dividend expectations
= 0 are fulfilled.
Condition (50) implies that qt s p?/(l + n)Pt-i is identically equal to 1. Thus, the
sequence {St) defined as in (34) diverges to infinity. Divergence of (5f) implies, by Lemma
1, that the max-min level of per capita net earnings tt^ which the intermediary can feasibly
achieve is zero. Consequently, the solution set for the intermediary's optimization problem
(32) consists of all feasible intermediation plans since, by definition, each such plan must
jdeld at least zero per capita net earnings in each period t> I. The stationary intermediation
plan bt = 6" is therefore an element of this solution set; for it is clearly a nondivergent plan,
and it yields tt^ = [1 —qt]b"' = 0 in each period t> I. Finally, since the intermediary making
use of the plan bt = 6" has zero net earnings in each period t > 1, he distributes zero per
share dividends in each period t > 1, implying that the per share dividend expectations
df = 0 are fulfilled. •
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: Suppose v' = i > 1) is a sequence of values for kt
and bt corresponding to a Pareto inefficient equilibrium for the Brokered Economy. As seen
in the proof of Theorem 2, v* must solve the Diamond-Tirole state equations (12) and (13).
As established by Tirole (1985, Propositions 1 and 2, pp. 1504 and 1507), the solutions
to the state equations (12) and (13) can be partitioned into two subsets: the Pareto efficient
solutions which converge to the golden-rule equiUbrium state vector (fc", 6"); and the Pareto
inefficient solutions which converge to the bubbleless state vector (^,0). It follows from
Tirole's results that the Pareto inefficient solution v* must converge to (fc, 0), hence the
interest rate r" associated with v* must converge to f = f'{k).
An assumption made by both Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), and maintained through
out the current paper, is that f < n. Consequently, f implies that there exists some
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T >2 and some e > 0 such that r* < r" = n —e for all t>T. Let Uf = [1 +
u = 1 + r*]/[l + n
Making use of the viability condition appearing in the definition for a Brokered Economy
equilibrium, and the nonnegativity of equilibrium per share dividend expectations, it follows
as in (48) that the (positive) stock share prices along the equilibrium path v" must satisfy
(51) qt = p?/(l+n)p^_i < Ut < u < 1
for all t>T. But the relation (51) implies that (5t) defined as in (34) is a bounded sequence.
Specifically, for each i > T + 2, the nonnegative sequence term St is bounded above by
(52) 5* = 1 + W+ + . . . + + U^[T - l]Cma£,
where r = t —T, and Cynax denotes the largest of the T —1 products c^, 3 = 2, •••T, defined
by Cg = [qr " ' 9a]. Since >0 as r —»• +oo, the sequence (5J) converges to 1/[1 —u]. It
then follows from Theorem 1 that the solution set -B(p^) for the intermediary's optimization
problem (32) is empty, which contradicts the assumption that v* is a Brokered Economy
equilibrium.
It follows that all Brokered Economy equilibria must be Pareto efficient. •
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1: Tirole (1985, p. 1504) establishes for the Diamond-Tirole
Economy that, given any capital-labor ratio ^ > 0, there exists a maximum feasible positive
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value b= b{k) for per capita bubble asset holdings consistent with equilibrium. Starting with
(k^b) as initial conditions in any period r > 1, the unique solution to the stationary state
equations (12) and (13) is a Pareto efficient Diamond-Tirole equilibrium path for (fe<, 6^) over
periods t > t which converges to the golden-rule outcome (fe", 6"). Starting with (k, 6), b E
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0,6), as initial conditions in any period r > 1, the unique solution to these state equations
is a Pareto inefficient Diamond-Tirole equilibrium path for {ktj bt) over periods t > t which
converges to (fc, 0).
As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, everyBrokered Economy equilibirumpath for (fct, 6^)
must solve the state equations (12) and (13). However, as established in Theorem 3, only the
Pareto efficient solution paths for these state equations are tenable equilibrium outcomes for
the Brokered Economy. The proof of the first corollary statement then follows immediately
once it is recalled that bt = BtfLt, where Lf = [1 + n]*Lo denotes the number of agents born
in period t for exogenously given values n > 0 and Lq > 0.
Now let Rt denote the product of the interest factors [1 + r^] for periods j = 1,... ,T.
The tail term for periods t > T in the calculation of the fundamental value of the initial
stock share price pj is then given by
rl. n -J-
(53) Pt Pt X
1 + n
Rt 1 + n T Rt
Pt
X
1 + n T >r
(qr-'-qiW XEl
kr
The price Pq equals its fundamental value if and only if the tail term (53) converges to zero
as r —> oo. Howeyer, it follows from previous observations that It must be positive and
convergent to 6" > 0 along any equilibrium path for the Brokered Economy. Consequently,
the second corollary statement is also estabHshed. •
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